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 Abstract 
Most of the studies existing in theoretical and empirical understanding of the 
macroeconomic consequences of oil price shocks have been focused on US aggregate 
data. In contrast to these studies, this paper assesses empirically the dynamic effects of oil 
price shocks on the output of the main manufacturing industries in six OECD countries 
using an identified vector autoregression for each economy. The pattern of responses to an 
oil price shock by industrial output is diverse across the four European Monetary Union 
(EMU) countries under consideration (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), but broadly 
similar in the UK and the US. Evidence on cross-industry heterogeneity of oil shock effects 
within the EMU countries is also reported. Moreover, our baseline results are quite robust 
with respect to changes in the number of lags, identification assumptions, and real oil price 
definition. 
JEL classification: E32, Q43. 
Keywords: oil price shock; identified VAR; manufacturing industries. 
 
 
1 Introduction
"Oil price shocks present policy-makers with difficult choices as they si-
multaneously pose upside risks to inflation and downside risks to growth. In
responding to oil price shocks, it is essential to understand that policy-makers
cannot offset the real effects of oil price increases. An oil price increase triggers
a loss in the economy’s terms-of-trade and implies a transfer of wealth from
oil-importing countries to oil exporters. This change in the terms-of-trade (in
relative prices) requires an adjustment of the real economy and must be absorbed
by markets. The policy-makers’ aim should be to facilitate this adjustment by
minimising inflationary pressures and aggregate output losses."
Speech by Lucas Papademos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank,
delivered at the Nomura Annual Euro Conference “A challenging future for
Europe”, Tokyo, 11 November 2004.
The analysis of the macroeconomic impact of oil price shocks has long been
the subject of a vast and growing literature. Most of the empirical studies
have relied on aggregate data,1 concluding that an increase in oil prices has
a significant negative impact on the GDP growth and contributes to higher
inflationary pressures in oil-importing countries. The disaggregated effects of
oil price shocks, however, have remained understudied, being Bohi (1989) and
Lee and Ni (2002) the main exceptions.2 While the latter authors focus on the
effects of oil price shocks on demand and supply in several US manufacturing
industries, the former also analyses the impact of oil price shocks on economies
different from the US - Germany, Japan, and the UK - in the two energy price
shocks of the 1970s. On the one hand, Bohi (1989) finds no correlation between
the declines in industry-level outputs and the energy intensities of the industries
during the two energy crises considered. Lee and Ni (2002), on the other hand,
show that oil price shocks have a variety of negative effects upon US industries,
with oil shocks mostly reducing the supply of oil-intensive industries and the
demand of many other industries, specifically the automobile industry.
The comparison of the impact of oil price shocks across different industries
provides valuable information for policy-makers on how oil shocks are propa-
gated through industrial activity, and so it helps us to better understand the
effects of such shocks on aggregate output and inflation.3 This information
may be also useful in understanding the consequences of the monetary policy
reactions that may be undertaken to counteract such shocks.4
1While most of these studies have focused on the US (see Rasche and Tatom, 1981; Darby,
1982; Hamilton, 1983; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986; Mork, 1989; Hamilton, 1996; Hooker 1996;
Hamilton, 2003; among others), very few studies have considered countries different from the
US (see e.g. Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Mork et al., 1994; Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez,
2005; and Kilian, 2005).
2Davis and Haltiwager (2001) study the effects of oil price changes and other shocks on
the creation and destruction of US manufacturing jobs. They show that oil shocks account
for about 20-25 percent of the variance in the US manufacturing employment growth and also
generate important reallocative effects.
3Notice that oil price shocks may feed through the economy and generate further indirect
effects in the coming months.
4Authors like Bohi (1989), Bernanke et al. (1997), and Hamilton and Herrera (2004) among
others, point out that the indirect effects of oil price shocks involve monetary policy reactions.
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The present paper extends the empirical work on oil price impacts by analysing
the disaggregated effects of an oil price shock on industrial output of four Eu-
ropean Monetary Union (EMU) countries (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain),
the UK and the US.5 Our aim is to shed more light on the question whether
there are significant differences in the reactions of the manufacturing industries
of these economies to oil price shocks. Thus, we investigate the pattern of output
responses to an oil price shock in the different industries considered, analysing
whether these responses provide evidence on cross-industry heterogeneity of oil
shock effects, as well as evidence on cross-country heterogeneity. To do so, we
consider an identified VAR model for each country considered using monthly
data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the method-
ology. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 discusses the robust-
ness of the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Econometric specification and identification
We consider a pth-order structural Vector Autoregression model that includes
both macroeconomic and industry-level variables (i.e., Yt = [Y1t Y2t]0). Let
Y1t be a (N1 × 1) vector that contains the macroeconomic variables: the To-
tal Industrial Production (yt),6 the Consumer Price Index (cpit), a monetary
aggregate (mt), a nominal short-term interest rate (srt), the Real Effective Ex-
change Rate (xrt), and the real oil price (oilt).7 Let Y2t be a (N2 × 1) vector
that contains the specific industrial variables; in this case, we only consider the
specific industrial output (yjt) because data availability does not allow us to
include the specific industrial price. All variables except interest rates are in
logs.8 See Data Appendix for a detailed data description.
The reduced-form VAR model is the following
Yt = c+R(L)Yt + ut, (1)
where R(L) = R1L+R2L2+...+RpLp is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator
L, and ut is the generalisation of a white noise process with variance-covariance
matrix Ω =
·
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
¸
. We impose, as Lee and Ni (2002) and Davis and
Haltiwanger (2001) did, that macroeconomic variables affect industrial variables,
5The lack of monthly data by sub-sector for all countries under study forces us to confine
the analysis to the industrial level.
6We use Total Industrial Production as a proxy of economic activity instead of GDP,
because they are highly correlated and the latter is only available at quarterly frequency.
7The use of non-linear transformations of oil price to analyse the impact of oil price shocks
on aggregate output has been theoretically justified by the inter-sectoral adjustments to which
they involve (see Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2005, and references therein). Thus, we do
not apply such transformations in our study given that our main goal is to analyse the impact
at the industrial level, and their use may give rise to biased results.
8 In this paper we do not perform an explicit analysis of the long-run behaviour of the
economy. By doing the analysis in levels we allow for implicit cointegrating relationships in
the data, and still have consistent estimates of the parameters. For further discussion in this
issue, see e.g. Sims et al. (1990), Hamilton (1994), and Ramaswamy and Slφk (1998).
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but the latter variables do not affect the former variables.9 Thus, macroeco-
nomic shocks are the same for all industries and the cross-industry comparison of
responses to such shocks is meaningful. The economic interpretation behind this
assumption is that changes in a specific industrial output are not individually
able to affect the macroeconomy. However, this assumption is not incompatible
with the fact that changes in output of several industries involve macroeconomic
consequences.·
Y1t
Y2t
¸
=
·
c1
c2
¸
+
·
R11(L) 0
R21(L) R22(L)
¸ ·
Y1t
Y2t
¸
+
·
u1t
u2t
¸
, (2)
where Rij(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, i.e. Rij(L) =
R1,ijL+R2,ijL
2 + ...+Rp,ijL
p with i, j = 1, 2.
The structural VAR approach assumes that the disturbances ut are related
to structural macroeconomic shocks εt via a matrix, A0, such that A0ut = εt.
To ensure that macroeconomic shocks are the same for all industries we also
impose that A0 is block recursive (i.e., the macroeconomic variables are neither
contemporaneously affected by industrial variables):·
A011 0
A021 A
0
22
¸·
u1t
u2t
¸
=
·
ε1t
ε2t
¸
. (3)
Thus, the structural VAR is described by:
A0Yt = A0c+A0R(L)Yt + εt, (4)
where εt is a white noise vector with variance-covariance matrix given by the
identity matrix (without loss of generality). Although it would be possible to
identify a structural VAR when the structural shocks are smaller than the num-
ber of variables (see Uhlig, 2005, for sign restrictions approach, and Bernanke
and Boivin, 2003, for factor augmented VAR approach), we adopt, for simplic-
ity, the standard structural VAR approach with an exact match between the
number of structural shocks and the number of variables (see, for example, Kim
and Roubini, 2000). Thus, we assume A0 matrix to be square and invertible.
To achieve the identification of the model one could have used as the baseline
identification scheme the popular and convenient method based on the Choleski
decomposition (as in Sims, 1980, among others). However, this approach im-
plies a recursive structure which imposes restrictions (which cannot be tested)
on the basis of an arbitrary ordering of the variables and their estimate results
may be sensitive to the ordering imposed. As such, we identify the model by
using a non-recursive structure and we only consider the recursive structure to
examine the robustness of our results. The non-recursive identification used as
the baseline identification imposes exclusion on the contemporaneous incidence
9The likelihood ratio tests (based on the so-called block-exogeneity test) indicate that the
block-recursive restrictions (i.e., R12(L) = 0) cannot be rejected for most industries and most
countries, being the case of the UK the main exception. Even in the cases of rejection, the
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the macroblock, Ω11, is not significantly altered
by the presence of the specific industrial output. Thus, we estimate under the restriction that
macroeconomic variables are not affected by the specific industrial output.
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of the structural shocks based on prior theoretical and empirical information
about the economic structure.10


a1 0 0 0 0 a2 0
a3 a4 0 0 0 a5 0
a6 a7 a8 a9 0 0 0
0 0 a10 a11 a12 a13 0
a14 a15 a16 a17 a18 a19 0
0 0 0 0 0 a20 0
a21 a22 a23 a24 a25 a26 a27




u
y
t
u
cpi
t
umt
usrt
uxrt
uoilt
u
yj
t


=


ε
y
t
ε
cpi
t
εmt
εsrt
εxrt
εoilt
ε
yj
t


. (5)
Before we explain the details of our identifying restrictions, it is worth noting
that the following relations are contemporaneous restrictions on the structural
parameters of A0 without further restrictions on the lagged structural parame-
ters. In constructing our identifying restrictions, we follow Gordon and Leeper
(1994), Sims and Zha (1998), Kim and Roubini (2000), Davis and Haltiwanger
(2001), and Lee and Ni (2002). We assume that aggregate output is only contem-
poraneous influenced by oil price shocks, and the prices only react immediately
to innovations in aggregate output and oil prices. The first two equations of
the system (5) support the idea that the reaction of the real sector (aggregate
output and prices) to shocks in the monetary sector (money, interest rate and
exchange rate) is sluggish. The third equation of the system (5) can be inter-
preted as a short-run money demand equation. Money demand is allowed to
respond contemporaneously to innovations in output, prices and interest rate.
The forth equation represents the monetary policy reaction function. The mon-
etary authority sets the interest rate after observing the current money stock,
oil prices and the exchange rate, but does not respond contemporaneously to
disturbances in aggregate output and prices. The argument is that informa-
tion about the latter variables is only available with a lag, since they are not
observable within a month. The exchange rate, being an asset price, reacts
immediately to all other macroeconomic variables. We also assume that oil
prices are contemporaneously exogenous, that is, oil prices do not respond con-
temporaneously to disturbances in other macroeconomic variables (see Lee and
Ni, 2002, for discussion). Furthermore, the specific industrial output responds
contemporaneously to all macroeconomic variables.
As a result of the zero-restrictions imposed to identify our SVAR,11 the
sub-system referred to the macroeconomic variables is overidentified with one
overidentifying restriction. While to impose an overidentifying restriction in
the macroblock allows us to check the validity of the set of the full identifying
restrictions, this checking cannot be performed when the sub-system is just-
identified. Thus, we test the restricted model against the reduced-form model
10 It is worth noting that the non-recursive structure (contrary to the recursive one) allows us
here to consider the contemporaneous interactions between the interest rate and the exchange
rate, and the non-reaction of the interest rate contemporaneously to changes in output and
inflation (see Sims and Zha, 1998), as well as the contemporaneous interactions between the
interest rate and money stock (see Kim and Roubini, 2000).
11Notice that A21 and Ω21 contain the same numbers of elements, and so we do not impose
restrictions. The same thing happens with A22 and Ω22.
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by employing a likelihood ratio test: LR = 2ln L(Ωˆ11) − 2ln L(Ω˜11), which is
χ2(1) distributed under H0 (validity of the full set of identifying restrictions),
and ln L(Ωˆ11) and ln L(Ω˜11) are the concentrated log-likelihood functions for
the reduced and structural form, respectively (see Hamilton, 1994, and Amisano
and Giannini, 1997). The set of restrictions we select gives a χ2(1) p-value larger
than 0.05 for all countries under study. Clearly, that set of restrictions cannot
be rejected for any country.
We estimate the structural VAR model by maximum likelihood, with the
optimal lag length chosen on the basis of the Information Criteria. We ob-
tain the forecast-error variance decomposition, the impulse responses to an oil
price shock (a unit shock) and their corresponding confidence bands calculated
through a bootstrapping procedure with 100 draws, although no significant dif-
ferences exist when either 500 or 1000 repetitions are considered.
To verify the robustness of our baseline results, we first explore 3 alternative
identification schemes; second, we consider the standard lag length used in most
of the previous empirical studies concerning aggregate data; and finally, we re-
estimate our SVAR using real oil prices country specific, since the inflation
development over the period considered may differ significantly across countries
(see Appendices A-C).
We apply this methodology to four EMU countries (namely, France, Ger-
many, Italy and Spain), the UK, and the US. The industrial data refer to ag-
gregate manufacturing industry and eight individual manufacturing industries
grouped according to the two-digit International Standardized Industrial Clas-
sification (ISIC). The Data Appendix provides sources, and an explanation of
the choice of the Industry database considered. The available sample runs from
1975:1 to 1998:12, for all countries but France and Spain12 where data start in
1980:1. Despite the fact that our database ends in 1998:12 and does not allow
us to analyze what has happened in the last eight years, the analysis reported
in the present paper provides valuable lessons of experience. Although the past
does not repeat itself exactly, given that the global and country specific macro-
economic and geopolitical conditions change over time, it may help us to gauge
the vulnerability of the countries studied to the possible forthcoming oil supply
shocks.13
3 Empirical results
The analysis is focused on the response of manufacturing industrial output to an
oil price shock in the four EMU countries under consideration (namely, France,
Germany, Italy and Spain), the US, and the UK - the latter being the only net
12The Spanish results using the sample period 1975:1-1998:12 were not easy to reconcile with
the theory since they could reflect the Spanish policy implemented up to the end of 1970s
by subsidizing the oil prices. Thus, the effects of oil price shocks on the Spanish industries
could have been distorted by the use of 1970s’ data. Therefore, we have decided to reduce the
sample, starting in 1980:1, to avoid a distorted conclusion.
13Notice that the growing tendency of real oil prices from 2002 onwards differs from previous
oil price shocks, which were mainly caused by sizeable disruptions to the supply of oil. The
factors driving the oil price increases over the last years are basically caused by demand
factors.
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oil exporting country in our sample. A lack of data forces us to confine the
analysis to differences or similarities in the output effects, overlooking possible
differences or similarities in pricing behaviour. Figures 1-9 display the cumula-
tive dynamic effects on the manufacturing industrial output for each industry
and each country under consideration. In each figure, the dynamic effect of
an oil price shock is reported with a standard deviation band (calculated by
bootstrapping procedure) around the point estimated.
An oil price increase lowers the level of aggregate manufacturing output in
all countries under study, although the pattern of response differs somewhat
across countries (see Figure 1). On the one hand, a similar response of aggre-
gate manufacturing output is observed in the Anglo-Saxon countries and two
EMU countries - Germany and Italy -, becoming the negative effect perma-
nent.14 On the other hand, such an effect becomes positive two years after the
shock in France and Spain. Furthermore, not all countries respond by the same
magnitude. The magnitude of impact is larger in Anglo-Saxon countries than in
the EMU countries considered, with the largest negative impact observed in the
UK two years after the shock.15 Therefore, the results indicate that the sensi-
bility of aggregate manufacturing output to changes in oil prices differs marked
across the EMU countries under study, but it is similar in the US and the UK.
On examining the output responses of the eight industry groups within man-
ufacturing, we observe significant differential pattern of output responses to
an oil price shock across countries (see Figures 2-9). Whereas the output re-
sponses of EMU manufacturing industries substantially differ from country to
country, the negative pattern of responses is similar for most industries in the
Anglo-Saxon countries. Among EMU countries considered, similarities are ob-
served between German and Italian output reactions for four industries (namely,
"wood and wood products", "paper and paper products", "chemical", and "non-
metallic mineral products" industries), and also between French and Spanish
output responses for other four industries ("wood and wood products", "paper
and paper products", "non-metallic mineral products", and "metal products,
machinery and equipment" industries). Moreover, the Italian and German in-
dustrial output responses are relatively similar to those found in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, with all manufacturing industries negatively affected by an oil
price increase. The exceptions are the “textiles, wearing apparel and leather”
and “basic metals” industries in Germany, which have a positive response when
oil price increases.
To analyse the extent to which the industrial effects of oil price shocks are
similar across countries, we look at the standard correlation coefficient.16 We
first observe that the correlation coefficient of impulse responses in the two
Anglo-Saxon countries is larger than 0.80 for all industries but "basic metals"
14The finding that UK manufacturing activity falls after an increase in oil price is consis-
tent with what was reported for overall economic activity in Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez
(2005). These authors attribute this result to a Dutch disease-type effect.
15This result contrasts with the fact that the Anglo-Saxon countries seem to be less sensible
to oil shocks than the EMU countries under study according to the oil vulnerability indicators
(see Appendix D: Table D.1).
16The output responses in the "textiles, wearing apparel and leather" industry substantially
differ across countries, and so we take it out for comparison purposes.
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industry, where the coefficient decreases up to 0.70. Second, the correlation
coefficients of output responses between the Anglo-Saxon and German indus-
tries and those between the Anglo-Saxon and Italian industries reach values
larger than 0.50 for all industries. The exceptions are the correlation coefficients
between the Italian/German "non-metallic mineral products" industries and
their analogous UK industries, and those between the Italian/German "wood
and wood products" industries and their analogous US industries. Third, the
Italian-German correlation coefficient is above 0.90 for all industries but "food,
beverages and tobacco", "basic metals", and "metal products, machinery and
equipment" industries. Finally, a positive correlation (larger than 0.70) between
the responses of four industries (namely, "wood and wood products", "paper
and paper products", "non-metallic mineral products", and "metal products,
machinery and equipment" industries) is found for the other two EMU coun-
tries (France and Spain). Therefore, the output responses of the manufacturing
industries show cross-country heterogeneity for the four EMU countries consid-
ered and homogeneity across the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Regarding the responses of manufacturing industries within each country,
whereas we find evidence on cross-industry heterogeneity of oil shock effects in
France, Germany, and Spain, similar responses are observed in Italy, the UK
and the US (see Figures 2-9).
The different effects may have to do with the manufacturing industrial struc-
tures and the oil consumptions, among other factors.17 First, whereas we ob-
serve that the Anglo-Saxon countries show high similarities in their manufactur-
ing industrial structures (see Appendix D: Table D.3), the similarities decrease
in the case of the EMU countries under consideration, being the German and
Italian structures the most similar ones. Second, we observe a general decrease
in oil consumption for all industries (exceptions: "food, beverages and tobacco"
and "chemical" industries) in all countries (see Appendix D: Figure D.1). In
the Anglo-Saxon countries, despite the fact that the oil consumption in the US
industries is proportionally larger than that observed in the British industries,
we observe a high similarity in the last years18 with two exceptions: "paper and
paper products" and "wood and wood products" industries, where the US con-
sumption is proportionally much larger. In the EMU countries, although there
is some disparity in consumptions, three industries - "food, beverages and to-
bacco", "chemical", and "non-metallic mineral products" industries - maintain
their most important oil consumption. Additionally, other possible explanations
for our results like those related to the product and labour market rigidities have
been also explored, although these alternative/complementary explanations do
not actually help us to understand what is behind our results. According to the
index of product market regulation in the manufacturing sector and the indica-
tor about overall strictness of employment protection legislation (both reported
by OECD) and information from the Fraser Institute, the Anglo-Saxon countries
exhibit more flexible product and labour markets than those of the EMU coun-
17Table D.2 from Appendix D identifies the manufacturing industries among the different
databases used (see Appendix D for further details).
18We only compare the last years since the US data from the homogeneous Energy Statistics
database are only available for the first eight and the last four years of the sample period (see
Appendix D: Table D.4, for data availability).
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tries under study.19 Thus, the manufacturing industries of the EMU countries
considered seem to be less flexible than those of the Anglo-Saxon countries, so it
would be expected that the EMU manufacturing industries are more adversely
affected by the disturbance in oil prices but it is not, however, the case.
To quantify the output effects of oil price shocks across industries and coun-
tries, we construct a summary measure of impact: the maximum elasticity
recorded between 12 and 36 months after an oil price increase. This maximum
elasticity is the smallest output change registered between 12 and 36 months
after an oil price shock. Table 1 reports this measure and the forecast-error
variance decomposition of output due to oil price shocks at the point of maxi-
mum elasticity. This measure reveals that the impact of an oil price shock on
industrial output is usually negative in all countries and the largest (negative)
impacts tend to be in the UK. While evidence on cross-country heterogeneity of
oil shock effects is observed in the EMU countries considered, a broadly similar
impact is observed in the UK and the US. Furthermore, the maximum elasticity
differs quantitatively across manufacturing industries within each country. The
industry more linked to housing and construction (that is, "wood and wood
products" industry) seems to be one of the most affected industries by an oil
price shock in all EMU countries under consideration,20 with oil price shocks
explaining the output variability of this industry with a percentage of around
20% in France and Germany, 10% in Italy and 6% in Spain. In the Anglo-Saxon
countries, however, the most affected industries are those linked to industrial
demand (that is, the "chemical" industry in the UK and the "metal products,
machinery and equipment" industry in the US) and the less affected industries
are the two industries linked more closely to personal consumption (that is,
"food, beverages and tobacco" and "textiles, wearing apparel and leather" in-
dustries). We observe that the share of output variability explained by oil prices
in the most affected industries is around 25% in the UK and around 15% in the
US, while the fraction of output’s variance due to oil prices is instead rather low
(around 5%) for the less affected industries.
The response heterogeneity to an oil price shock indicates that economic
policy should respond cautiously to oil price shocks. Lucas Papademos pointed
out in his speech (Tokyo, 11 November 2004) that "[...] in reacting to oil price
shocks, it is, therefore, important that policy-makers do not repeat the mis-
takes of the past [. . . ] Monetary policy should aim to ensure that inflation
expectations are not adversely affected by the unavoidable “first-round” direct
and indirect effects of an oil price shock on the price level and that they re-
main anchored to price stability. By preventing oil price shocks from having
“second-round” effects on inflation expectations and on wage and price-setting
behaviour, monetary policy can contain the unfavourable consequences of these
shocks on both inflation and growth [...] we at the ECB stress the need to be
extremely vigilant against the materialisation of second-round effects that may
result from a rise in oil prices." The adoption of a common monetary policy to
19An Appendix with all this information is available from the author upon request.
20The most negative effects are on "wood and wood products" and "non-metallic mineral
products" industries in France and Germany, being the former industry also the most affected
in the Spanish case. Moreover, "wood and wood products" and "paper and paper products"
industries record the largest maximum impacts in Italy.
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counteract oil shocks may well create asymmetric effects as long as the effects
of oil price shocks are different in the EMU industries under study. Moreover,
while country specific fiscal policy might be possible to smooth final prices by
adjusting energy taxes, there is a number of reasons why such a policy may
be problematic (nature of the oil shock: temporary or permanent, application
environment, budget constraints, among others; for further details see OECD,
2006).
To summarize, we show evidence on cross-industry heterogeneity of oil shock
effects in the EMU countries, being Italy the only EMU considered in which
manufacturing industries respond similarly. We also find that the output re-
sponses of all the industries considered are highly similar within the UK and
the US. Furthermore, we observe heterogeneity of output response across EMU
countries, but not so across Anglo-Saxon countries. These results seem to be
more related to the manufacturing industrial structures than the oil consump-
tions.
4 Robustness of the results
The benchmark results on the dynamic effects of oil price shocks presented
in the previous section rely on specific identification assumptions and the lag
length chosen. For all countries under consideration the optimal lag length is
substantially shorter than that used in most of the previous empirical studies
using aggregate data (i.e., twelve months). As such, we repeat our analysis by
considering twelve lags. Likewise, we check the sensitivity of our baseline results
to three alternative identifying schemes. First, oil price shocks can be identi-
fied through a standard Choleski decomposition with the variables ordered as
follows: [oil, y, cpi,m, sr, xr, yj]. The Choleski decomposition implies that each
variable is contemporaneously affected only by variables which are above in
the ordering. Thus, this ordering presupposes that oil price variable does not
contemporaneously react to the rest of the variables in the system. Aggregate
output is also ranked as a largely exogenous variable, having an immediate im-
pact on prices, money, interest rate and the effective exchange rate. Another
underlying assumption is that monetary policy shocks have no contemporaneous
impact on output, prices and money. A monetary policy shock does have an
immediate impact on the exchange rate, but the central banks do not respond
to changes in the exchange rate within the month. Specific industrial output re-
sponds contemporaneously to all macroeconomic shocks. Second, an alternative
recursive ordering of the variables considered here follows Jiménez-Rodríguez
and Sánchez (2005), adapting their ordering to our set of variables. We exclude
long-term interest rate and real wages, but we include monetary aggregate and
specific industrial output: [y, oil, cpi,m, sr, xr, yj]. Finally, we adapt the recur-
sive identification proposed by Christiano et al. (1999) with both the inclusion
of oil price variable, exchange rate and industrial output, and the exclusion of
non-borrowed reserves, total reserves and commodity price. Thus, the ordering
of the variables is as follows: [y, cpi, sr,m, xr, oil, yj]. In all cases, the orderings
of the variables considered are implicitly assuming that A0 is block recursive,
with macroeconomic variables also not being affecting contemporaneously by
10
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specific industrial output.
The results using any of these alternative schemes are remarkably similar
to our baseline results (see Appendix A). Moreover, the results obtained using
12 lags compared with our baseline results indicate quite similar responses (see
Appendix B).21
In addition, we check to what extent our baseline results are sensitive to the
real oil price definition by re-estimating our SVAR using real oil prices country
specific. These results do not change considerably compared with our baseline
results (see Appendix C).22
In sum, the output responses are quite robust with respect to changes in the
number of lags, identification assumptions, and real oil price definition.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the effects of oil price shocks on the output of the main
manufacturing industries in six industrialized countries using disaggregated data
at the industry level. The pattern of responses to oil price shocks by industrial
output is diverse across the four EMU countries under study (France, Germany,
Italy, and Spain), but highly similar in the UK and the US. Moreover, while
the effects of an oil price shock seem to be unevenly distributed across the
manufacturing industries in three of the four EMU countries under consideration
(France, Germany, and Spain), the response homogeneity is the general norm
in the remaining countries.
Therefore, response heterogeneity across EMU countries is shown, but not
so across Anglo-Saxon countries. Also, evidence on cross-industry heterogeneity
of oil shock effects within the EMU countries is found. These results seem to be
more related to the manufacturing industrial structures than the oil consump-
tions. Furthermore, our baseline results are quite robust with respect to changes
in the number of lags, identification assumptions, and real oil price definition.
21Due to space constraints, we only report the impulse-response functions of "chemical"
industries as a sample. The remaining impulse responses are available from the author upon
request.
22 In Appendix C, we only report the impulse-response functions of "chemical" industries as
a sample. The remaining impulse responses are available from the author upon request.
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6 Data Appendix
A.1. Macroeconomic data
The macroeconomic data used in this study and their sources are as fol-
lows: CPI from IMF’s International Financial Statistics - henceforth IFS- for
all countries but Germany, where data come from Deutsche Bundesbank (hence-
forth DB); Total Industrial Production from IFS; short-term interest rate from
IFS for all countries except France (from OECD’s Main Economic Indicators,
henceforth MEI); REER fromMEI; and monetary aggregate from IFS for France
(M3) and the US (M1), from DB for Germany (M1), from Banca d’Italia for
Italy (M1), from National Government for Spain (M3) and for the UK (M0);
real oil prices are computed as the UK Brent price deflated by the US PPI (both
from IFS); finally, real oil prices country specific are given by the ratio of the
UK Brent price converted into domestic currency (using exchange rates from
IFS) and the corresponding CPI.
A.2. Industrial data
The choice of Industry database has not been an easy task. We arrange
two Industry database: the OECD-STAN Industry database (annual data over
the period 1970-2001) and the OECD database "Indicators for Industry and
Services" (monthly data over the period 1990:1-2001:9), both based on the In-
ternational Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision 3. The former
does not allow us to well uncover our aim, since we are interested in the dy-
namic effects of oil price shocks at lower frequency. In turn, the latter does not
include data corresponding to the important movements of oil prices occurred
in the mid-70s and the 1980s. Nevertheless, the latter database is also available
monthly classified according to the ISIC Revision 2 from 1975:1 to 1998:12. The
two classification systems (ISIC Revision 2 and ISIC Revision 3) are not fully
compatible and, thus, comparisons have to be made with caution, as we do when
elaborating Table D.2 from Appendix D.
Therefore, we have chosen the OECD database "Indicators for Industry and
Services" (ISIC Rev.2) because it better uncovers the periods in which oil prices
have had more influence. Data are indices (seasonally adjusted) on the base
1990 = 100. The following industries for each country are included in our
analysis:
- Manufacturing (3)
- Food, beverages and tobacco (31)
- Textiles, wearing apparel and leather (32)
- Wood and wood products (33)
- Paper and paper products (34)
- Chemical industries (35)
- Non-metallic mineral products (36)
- Basic metals (37)
- Metal products, machinery and equipment (38).
12
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of industry 3 (manufacturing) to an oil price shock.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of industry 31 (food, beverages and tobacco) to an
oil price shock.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of industry 32 (textiles, wearing apparel and
leather) to an oil price shock.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of industry 33 (wood and wood products) to an oil
price shock.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of industry 34 (paper and paper products) to an
oil price shock.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of industry 35 (chemical industries) to an oil price
shock.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of industry 36 (non-metallic mineral product) to
an oil price shock.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of industry 37 (basic metals) to an oil price shock.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses of industry 38 (metal products, machinery and
equipment) to an oil price shock.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of industry 3 (manufacturing) to an oil price shock
under different identification schemes: baseline identification (solid lines), first
alternative identification (dashed lines), second alternative identification (dotted
and dashed lines), and third alternative identification (dotted lines).
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of industry 31 (food, beverages and tobacco) to
an oil price shock under different identification schemes: baseline identifica-
tion (solid lines), first alternative identification (dashed lines), second alterna-
tive identification (dotted and dashed lines), and third alternative identification
(dotted lines).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of industry 32 (textiles, wearing apparel and
leather) to an oil price shock under different identification schemes: baseline
identification (solid lines), first alternative identification (dashed lines), second
alternative identification (dotted and dashed lines), and third alternative iden-
tification (dotted lines).
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of industry 33 (wood and wood products) to an oil
price shock under different identification schemes: baseline identification (solid
lines), first alternative identification (dashed lines), second alternative identi-
fication (dotted and dashed lines), and third alternative identification (dotted
lines).
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of industry 34 (paper and paper products) to an oil
price shock under different identification schemes: baseline identification (solid
lines), first alternative identification (dashed lines), second alternative identi-
fication (dotted and dashed lines), and third alternative identification (dotted
lines).
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of industry 35 (chemical industries) to an oil price
shock under different identification schemes: baseline identification (solid lines),
first alternative identification (dashed lines), second alternative identification
(dotted and dashed lines), and third alternative identification (dotted lines).
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of industry 36 (non-metallic mineral product) to
an oil price shock under different identification schemes: baseline identifica-
tion (solid lines), first alternative identification (dashed lines), second alterna-
tive identification (dotted and dashed lines), and third alternative identification
(dotted lines).
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of industry 37 (basic metals) to an oil price shock
under different identification schemes: baseline identification (solid lines), first
alternative identification (dashed lines), second alternative identification (dotted
and dashed lines), and third alternative identification (dotted lines).
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Figure 9: Impulse responses of industry 38 (metal products, machinery and
equipment) to an oil price shock under different identification schemes:baseline
identification (solid lines), first alternative identification (dashed lines), second
alternative identification (dotted and dashed lines), and third alternative iden-
tification (dotted lines).
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Figure 10: Impulse responses of industry 35 (chemical industries) to an oil price
shock using the optimal lag (solid line) and twelve lags (dashed line).
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Appendix C
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Figure 11: Impulse responses of industry 35 (chemical industries) to one s.d.
oil price shock under different oil price definition: real oil prices (solid lines) and
real oil prices country specific (dashed lines).
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Appendix D
Amárach Consulting develops an oil vulnerability index (based on World
Bank figures), which illustrates the sensitivity of an economy to developments
in the global oil industry. This vulnerability is based on three measures: first,
the sensitivity of the economy to a rise in oil prices (first column, Table D.1);
second, the dependence of the economy on imported oil rather than indigenously
produced oil (second column, Table D.1); and, finally, the share of oil in the
total energy consumed by the economy (third column, Table D.1). These three
measures combine to create the oil vulnerability index displayed in the forth
column of Table D.1, with a higher index equating to greater vulnerability.
The OECD database "Indicators for Industry and Services" (ISIC Rev.2)
only reports indices (seasonally adjusted) on the base 1990 = 100. This data
presentation does not allow to establish the exact share of total manufacturing
production for each industry under consideration. Thus, we decide to use the
OECD-STAN Industry database (annual data over the period 1975-1998) to
report the manufacturing structure for each country. To do so, we take into
account the fact that the OECD-STAN database is based on the ISIC Revision
3 classification and we carefully make an equivalence among the industries of
both classifications (first and second columns, Table D.2). Table D.3 reports the
manufacturing industrial structure of each country under consideration. Fur-
thermore, the data of "oil consumption by industry" do not exactly correspond
with any ISIC classification, and so we also perform another equivalence be-
tween the industries reported by the Energy Statistics of OECD Countries and
the ISIC Revision 2 classification (first and third columns, Table D.2). It is
worth noting that oil consumption data are not always available, and although
more complete data may be available for the US from other databases, we have
decided to use an homogenous database. Thus, Table D.4 reports the availabil-
ity of such data by year, by country and by industry and Figure D.1 displays
the oil consumption of each country considered by industry and by year.
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  Table D.1: Oil Indicators   
          
   OPS (1)   OID (2)     OED (3) OVI (4)    
 France -0.40 0.96 0.37 1.73 
 Germany   -0.60 0.95 0.40 1.95 
 Italy -0.50 0.94 0.50 1.94 
 Spain -0.60 0.98 0.54 2.12 
 UK 0.20 -0.51 0.36 1.07 
 US -0.40 0.54 0.39 1.33 
 
             
Note: (1) Oil Price Sensitivity (OPS): the percentage 
change of GDP on 1999-2001 base as a result of a $10/bbl oil price 
rise (data from World Bank calculations). (2) Oil Import Dependence 
(OID): (Oil consumption - Indigenous oil production)/Oil consumption 
(data from Energy International Agency, EIA). (3) Oil Energy 
Dependence (OED): ratio of petroleum consumption to total primary 
energy consumption (data from EIA). (4) Oil Vulnerability Index (OVI): 
sum of (1)-(3) (using absolute value of price elasticity). Sources: 
Indicators (1), (2) and (3) from Bacon (2005); Indicator (4) from 
Amárach Consulting estimates. 
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Table D.2: Identification of manufacturing industries among the different databases
ISIC Rev.2    STAN Energy Statistics
Industry 31 Food, beverages and tobacco Food, beverages and tobacco Food and tobacco
Industry 32 Textiles, wearing apparel and leather Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and footwear Textile and leather
Industry 33 Wood and wood products Wood and products of wood and cork Wood and wood products
Industry 34 Paper and paper products Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing Paper, pulp and print
Industry 35 Chemical industries Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products Chemical and petrochemical
Industry 36 Non-metallic mineral products Other non-metallic mineral products Non-metallic minerals
Industry 37 Basic metals Basic metals and fabricated metal products Iron and steel
Industry 38 Metal products, machinery and equipment Machinery and equipment Machinery
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Table D.3: Manufacturing industries  
                 (share of total manufacturing production) 
             
  France Germany Italy Spain UK US 
Industry 31 14.53 15.61 16.60 25.76 19.71 17.86 
Industry 32 6.24 5.94 15.61 11.50 8.07 6.94 
Industry 33 1.27 2.18 2.29 2.52 2.05 2.47 
Industry 34 5.60 7.55 5.35 7.07 10.06 11.32 
Industry 35 17.83 20.02 20.40 19.21 20.08 22.73 
Industry 36 3.33 4.33 5.20 6.74 3.31 2.91 
Industry 37 36.26 15.96 15.39 14.86 15.62 14.40 
Industry 38 14.98 28.42 19.15 12.33 21.09 21.36 
   Note: Average of annual data for the 1975-1998 period.  
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Table D.4: Availability of oil consumption (thousand tonnes) by year and by industry
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
France Industry 31 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 32 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 33 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Industry 34 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 35 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 36 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 37 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 38 .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Germany Industry 31 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 32 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 33 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 34 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 35 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 36 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 37 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 38 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Italy Industry 31 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 32 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 33 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Industry 34 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 35 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 36 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 37 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 38 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Source: Energy Statististics of OECD countries
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Table D.4: Availability of oil consumption (thousand tonnes) by year and by industry (cont.)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Spain Industry 31 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 32 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 33 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 34 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 35 .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 36 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 37 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 38 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
UK Industry 31 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 32 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 33 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 34 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 35 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 36 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 37 .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 38 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
US Industry 31 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 32 .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 33 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 34 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 35 .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 36 .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 37 ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Industry 38 .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ
Source: Energy Statististics of OECD countries
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         Figure D.1: Oil consumption (thousand tonnes) by year and by industry
        Note: These data come from the Energy Statistics of OECD Countries. See Table D.4 for 
                 data availability.
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 Figure D.1: Oil consumption (thousand tonnes) by year and by industry (cont.)
        Note: These data come from the Energy Statistics of OECD Countries. See Table D.4 for 
                 data availability.
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